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Franchisor Environmental Liability for Previously
Contaminated Property
Patrick J. Kaufmann and William S. Vincent
Environmental legislation has created potential liability for retailing franchisees tha'
purchase previously contaminated land. Because of the quasi-integrated nature of the
franchise relationship, the franchisor also .may be drawn indirectly into liability for its
franchisee's cleanup costs. The franchisor has two options to reduce i.'s chance of licbility.
Faced with a decision to distance itself from the site selection process or incur the added
costs and potential pricing inipac::s of greater involvement in the process, franchisors nave
strong incentives to reduce franchisee support. This reduction in suppo.t has detrimental
implications for both franchise policy and environmental policy. The authors report xhe
res.dts of an empirical study that links franchisors' concerns about potential environmental
liability to actions to distance themselves from the site selection proceso or. alternatively,
formally to require franchisee environmental investigation of all prospective properties.
Public policies son:etimes collide, Ar. example of sucha collision is the application of the ComprehensiveEnvironmental Response, Compensation, and Liabili-
ties Act's (CERCLA) (42 U,S,C, § 9601, e: seq,) cleanup
cost liability to franchisors that have assis;ed franchisees in
selecting sites that later are found to hâ  e been contami-
nated. Helping franchisees find suitable reiaî . sites is one of
the most important services franchisors pro'^ide. It signifi-
cantly increases the chance of survival for th^se smail busi-
nesses, a key policy goal of franchise regulation. Holding
franchisors liable for cleanup costs on the basis of their pro-
viding such services creates a perverse incentive to reduce
their support for the franchisees,
A better, but costly, alternative approach to avoiding
cleanup costs is to order a Phase I Environmental Assess-
ment, Environmental policy is served well when franchisees
choose to comm.ission environrr ental assessn:,ents of all sus-
picious sites. It provides for the timely identification of con-
taminated sites and increases the chance that the. costs of
cleanup will be home by the guilty party. If the franchisor
requires such an assessment, however, the franchisor has
changed the assessment from ar. independent business deci-
sion of the franchisee to the equivalent of an increase in the
price of the franchise. Franchisors want to sell franchises. It
is unlikely that a franchisor enthusiasticaKy will choose to
increase its price, especially when there is :he less costly
option of distancing itself from the process.
Because of the prevalence of franchising in the U,S, econ-
omy, the impact of environmental policy on franchising and
vice versa have significant implications. Franchising now
accounts for over one-third of all U,S. retail dollars (Uni-
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and is arguably the most important mettiod of distribution
for a wide range of products and services.' It has been esti-
mated that in 1990 there were over 500,000 retail franchised
establishments (Trutko, Trutko, and Ko,s!:ecka 1993), Unde-
veloped retail sites appropriate to franchised businesses are
increasingly hard to find, and the chances of purchasing pre-
viously contaminated propeny are substantial.
Theoretically, franchising is an extremely efficient orga-
nizational form that creates incentives for franchisees to
work hard and for franchisors to provide a full range of sup-
port ser\ ices (Rubin 1978), In practice, however, some fran-
chisors abdicate their responsibility to support their fran-
chisees, and franchisees, often having invested their life sav-
ings, cire vulnerable to severe financial losses. How to
ensure that franchisees are not disappointed in their reliance
on franchisor services and the role that regulation should
play in reaching that goal have been central focuses of the
policy debate (U.S, House of Representatives 1990; see also
Continental Franchise Review 1995c, IS96), In fact, aggres-
sive protection of "franchisees, the majority being sm-all
businesses," from franchisor abuse was the only specific
enforcement initiative singled out and urged on the Federal
Trade Commission in the Appropriations Committee Report
accompanying H,R, 3814, the 1996 appropriations bill (L',S,
House Committee on Appropriations 1996),
Here, we argue that in pursuing well-established environ-
mental protection goals, couns and regulators inadvertently
.may have created incentives for some franchisors to reduce
the level of support they provide their franchisees. When a
' here are iwo general torms of iranchising: bus i ness torma.t franchising
and product n-ancbising. Business format franchisors are typicaiiy operat-
ing retailers Lhat license franchisees :o repiicaie t:ieir business fortriats or
concepts :n another geographic location (e.g.. McDonald's. Midas. Jiffy
Lube), Produci franchisors are typically manur'acturers that seek to control
the channels of distribution by i^strlcring distribution of their produces to
licensed franchisees. Some are retail franchisors (e.g., Generai Motors),
and some are whoiesale S-anchisors (e,g,, Coca-Cola), We focus here on
busi.nes.s format franchising.
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franchisee purchases or leases a site that turns ouc to have
been contaminated previously, that franchisee is liable as
owner and operator for the costs of cleanup. Whether the
franchisor also is held liable turns on the level of involve-
ment in the site selection process.
The franchise relationship joins two parties that are func-
tionally dependent yet legally independent. It is this quasi-
integrated relationship that provides the franchisor with two
radically (different methods of controlling its exposure to
indirect environmental liability. It can (1) actively control
the franchisee's site selection process, require environmen-
tal assessments of all prospective sites,- and thus reduce its
own exposure by reducing the franchisee's e.xposure, or (2)
distance itself entirely from the site selection process and
the ongoing control of the franchise operation, leaving the
franchisee to fend for itself. In other words the franchisor
can approach and solve the problem or seek to avoid entan-
glement in the problem. When franchisors take control of
the process, both environmental policy and franchise policy
are w-ell served. When franchisors distance themselves from
the process, neither policy is w ell served. Here, we examine
that approach/avoidance diiem.ma and suggest that the
unique and ubiquitous nature of franchising in the U.S.
economy necessitates clarification of the statute's applica-
tion to franchisors in the same way its application to banks
and other commercial lenders has been clarified.
We begin with an example of the franchisor's choice. We
then describe the relevant statutes and discuss the various
legal theories under which a franchisor might be held liable
for the cleanup of sites owned and operated by its fran-
chisees. Ne.xt, we develop several hypotheses that relate the
threat of environmental liability to possible responses by the
franchisor. We then describe a pretest of franchise attorneys
and report the methodology and findings of the franchisor
survey. We end with a discussion of the implications for
practice and policy.
An Example
As prime retail sites become more and more scarce, unused
but conveniently located sites, such as abandoned gas sta-
tions, are becoming increasingly attractive. Unfortunately,
the potential for finding contamination on such properties is
high, and under CERCLA, franchisees that place retail out-
lets on contaminated land can be held liable for the cleanup
costs, even if the contamination took place before they pur-
chased the property.
Consider the following: In 1990, a prospective franchisee
was finalizing the purchase of a franchise and what
appeared to be a perfect site for its new restaurant. The
$25,000 franchisee fee was competitive with other fran-
chises, and the 350,000 for what appeared to be undevel-
oped land seemed reasonable. The prospective franchisee
was preparing to sign both the land purchase agreement and
the franchise agreement but first was required to obtain the
franchisor's approval of the site.
^Here, we use the current term Phase I tnvirotmieniai Assessment lo
refer to the initiai e.xamination of a site to deiermsne its potential for coni-
arnination. Previously, this e.^cmination was referred :o as a Phase ! E.'iV!-
ronmental .Audit. That :erm, ho-.¥ever. now is used to refer only to govern-
[rent-conducted e.Jiam'natiQns.
At this point, several things could have happened relevant
to this article. The franchisor could have withheld approval
pending a Phase I Environmental Assessment of the prop-
erty at the franchisee's e.xpense. If it did so, the relative cost
of buying this franchise would increase by at least iO%,3
and the franchisee might have purchased a competing fran-
chise. The franchisor could have paid for the assessment
itself by increasing either its own costs or its franchise fee
(wich the same result of possibly losing the sale). Alterna-
tively, the franchisor could have approved the site and left it
up to the franchisee to decide what to do about pocenti.a.!
environmental liability.
As it turned out, the franchisor had been involved actively
in the site selection process (e.g., engaging in market
demand studies). It continued this active involvement by
requiring an environmental assessment. The franchisee
finally and begrudgingly agreed to pay the additional
e.xpense rather than seek another less demanding franchise
system. The examiner found that a gas station had been
operated on the site and subsequently had been tom down.
Further investigation determined that the leaking tanks that
remained below the surface of the propeny required a
cleanup that would amount to $500,000. The seller, not the
franchisee, ultimately bore the cost of cleanup.
In this e.xample, the franchisor approached the problem
directly and required that the franchisee conduct a Phase I
Assessment prior to the approval of the site. As it turned out,
by requiring the assessment, the contamination was revealed,
and the franchisor reduced its own liability as well as that of
the franchisee. But that is all hindsight. The property could
have been clean. By requiring the assessment, the franchisor
increased the relative price of its franchise in the highly com-
petitive market for franchises and nearly lost the sale. Know-
ing this, the franchisor might have attempted to avoid becom-
ing entangled in the possible environmental liability and
might not have increased the price of the franchise To avoid
such entanglement, however, the franchisor not only vvould
need to leave the assessment decision up to the franchisee,
but also might need to remove itself from the siie selection
process entirely and perhaps change che level of ongoing sap-
port it offers its franchisees. In other v/ords, current environ-
mental regulation not only permits, but also may encourage,
franchis.ors to limit their e.xposure to environmental liability
by reducing support for their franchisees. In the next section,
we describe the legal theories under which a franchisor might
be drawn into a CERCLA action if it tries to take the middle
ground (i.e., offers support to its franchisees for site selection
and ongoing operations without completely controlling the
process and requiring the assessment).
Comprehensive Environmental Response.
Compensation, and Liabilities Act
CERCLA w as enacted in response to the increasing conceni
about the vast problems of contamination from and disposal
^Phase 1 Environmentai Assessmeiils typically cost between 52.500 anc
53.000 for rhe type Of sire in mis exampie. If a Phase f Assessment suggests
rhe necessity for a Phase II Assessment li.e., one including invasive proce-
dures such as aoii :es!ing>, costs ascajaie rapidly to beiween S 10,000 and
SI00.000. Required insurance against environmental Uabiiiiy is another
ODiion. This aiso would increase rhe relative price of the franchise.
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of hazardous and toxic waste throughout the country. CER-
CLA's purpose is to place xhe ultim.ate responsibility for
cleaning up hazardous waste on those responsible for caus-
ing the problems rather than on the government. CERCLA
authorizes the federal govertimeat, when necessarv., to clean
up hazardous waste sites and recover the costs of its cleanup
efforts from "responsible" parties. Responsible parties are
defined in 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) and include the '-present
owner or operator of a site where hazardous substances
have been released" (emphasis added).
CERCLA holds these owners or operators strictly liable
(without regard to fault) to the United States for e.xpenses
incurred in responding to the environmental and health haz-
ards posed by the waste iit that site (42 U.S.C. § 9607[a][l]:
New York v. Shore Reaij 1985). In other words, if a fran-
chisee purchases property that has been contaminated prior
to the purchase, it would be held strictly liable for cleanup
costs, even though it had nothing to do with the original con-
tamination. The franchisee's liability is based solely on its
current ownership of the contaminated property and/or the
fact that it is operating a business on the property. This
application of CERCLA to subsequent purchasers of conta-
minated property creates a mechanism for identifying prob-
lem sites each time the land changes hands. Thus, it should
be noted that liability derives not only from ownership of
the property, but also frcm the franchisee's failure to search
diligently for environmental, problems before purchase, as
discussed subsequently.
Although the potential, liability of the franchisee is equiv-
alent to that of any purchaser, die potential .iabiiity of the
franchisor presents more interesting and uaic ue legal, mar-
keting, and public policy issues (Sniff and Trachtenberg
1989). Under some of the legal theories suggested subse-
quently, franchisor liability for environmental cleanup
resembles the vicarious liability imposed en franchisors for
the actions of their franchisees (Morgan 1987), whereas
under other theories the cinalysis is quite different. In the
next section we explore some of these po.';si3le theories of
franchisor liability. In doing so, we assume that the fran-
chisee has purchased previously contaminated property and
would be held liable for cleanup under CERCLA.
Potential Sources of Franchisor
CERCLA Liability
Franchisor as "Operator" of the Site
Franchisors typically have "deeper pockets" than fran-
chisees. If a franchisee purchases a contaminated site, the
government may look to the franchisor for recovery of the
cosis of the environmental cleanup. One theory- available to
the government is that tlie franchisor is a co-operator of the
contaminated site along with the franchisee (see Table 1).
The term "operator,'" defined in the statute as any person
operating a facility, has been interpreted b'oadly. In U,S, v,
Kayser-Roth Corp,, Inc, (1990), the defendant was held
liable, because the coun found ±!at it had exerted sufficient
control over the corporadon occupying the site that it could
be deemed an operator cf the site (see Chem:side 1995).
Because of the unique, quasi-integrcted relationship
between franchisor and franchisee and the obligation of a
trademark holder to control the product or service delivered
under its trademark, the concept of franchisor as operator of
the franchised outlet is especially interesting. Some insight
may be gained as to the interpretation of the term ''operator"
in franchise cases from a similar type of law-suit involving
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). American
Dairy Queen, a franchisor, was sued over the compliance of
its franchisees with the provisions of the .\T>JK. In that case,
the Justice Department argued that the fnmchisor, .A.merican
Dairy' Queen, was the "operator" of the franchised outlets,
because the franchisees must obtain the franchisor's
approval before they build or modify a store (Margo Neff, et
aL V. American Daiiy Queen, Inc. 1994; see also Evelyn L.
Young, et al v, American Dairy Queen,, Inc, 1994). In a
friend-of-the-court brief, the Intemational Franchise Associ-
ation replied ihat this control was only over the look and feel
of the franchised unit and not over the day-to-day opera-
tions. Furthermore, if franchisors are held liable for bringing
the stores into compliance with ADA requirements, fran-
chisees will become free riders and wait for their franchisors
to make the necessary modifications (Ccrtinental Franchise
Review 1995a). This will have the uncesirable effect of
actually lessening the level of compliance within the system
and is therefore against public policy.
The District Court ruled, and the Court of .Appeals
affirmed, that though the franchisor had ±e right to approve
al! modifications to the building, it did rot have the right to
order modifications. Moreover, the ren:.£dial nature of the
statute was not thwarted by the ruling, because the fran-
chisee still could be sued {Margo Neff, st al, v, .American
Dairy Queen, Inc, 1994). Had the franchisor maintained the
right to order modifications to the buiieing, ho-wever, the
result might have been different.
The iVeJ"'decision turned on the definirion of "operator."
In the ADA'S legislative history, it is c.ear that Congress
rejected the idea of specifically addressing the franchise
relationship or adopting definitions of affiliated entities
from o-iher bodies of law, preferring the vague and ambigu-
ous concept of "operator" (Horn and Buckberg 1995).
Under CERCLA, franchisors face the same ambiguity,-.
It is likely ihat the government's aiguments involving
franchisors as operators under CERCLA vvould be similar to
those arising under ADA. If the franchisor has the right and
obligation under the contract to locate £ site for the fran-
chisee 'instead of simple veto power over undesirable sites),
the franchisor might be found to be an operator under the
test in Neff,
The increased potential for exposure to environmental lia-
bility occasioned by involvement in the site selection process
presents an incentive for the franchisor tc distance itself from
that cnicial support. This approach is not unusual in fran-
chising. Conventional wisdom in the franchise community is
that a good way to avoid legal entanglement is to reduce sup-
port for the franchisee in the particular irea under scrutiny.
For e.Kample, instead of requiring franchisees to institute sex-
ual harassment policies, franchisors havs been counseled to
avoid any involvement in the human resources funccion of
their franchisees lest they be dragged into sexual harassment
suits themselves (Continental Franchise Review 1995b).
All else being equal, the greater the perceived danger of
purchasing previously contaminated property, the more anx-
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CERCLA action directly against the franchisor H
Franchisor's control over franchises
Did franchisor play a form,al role in the site selection process?
CERCLA action against franchisee with franchisor joined for contribution Hi
Franchisor's contractual obligation to franchisee
Did franchisor formalize its role in the agreement to find a suitable site?
CERCLA action directly against franchisor H;
Indicia of ownership in the form of a security interest in propertv
Franchisor s control over franchisee
Did a secured franchisor play a formal role in the site selection process?
CERCLA action directly against franchisor based on operator status or indicia of ownership H,, Hi
Defense to liability based on the attempt to Identify contaminated properties
Did the franchisor require the environmental assessment of the site prior to approval?
ious the franchisor will be to avoid entanglement in the site
selection process. In terms of the approach/avoidance model
suggested previously, when faced with the threat of vicari-
ous environmental liability, one path open to the franchisor
is to avoid the site selection process altogether. We pose the
following hypothesis:
HJ: The greater the franchisor's a"Aareness of and concern about
liability for environmental cleanup, the less likely it is to
play a formal role in the franchisee's site selection activity.
Franchisor's Indirect Contractual Liability
Even if the government pursues only the franchisee that pur-
chased the contaminated site, the franchisor still could find
itself held liable. In this case, the franchisee may seek con-
tribution for cleanup costs on the basis of the franchisor
breaching its contract to find the franchisee a suitable site.
The extent of franchisors' obligations regarding site
selection varies widely. Some agreements provide only that
the franchisor has the right to approve the site after it has
been selected by the franchisee. Most often, franchisors
require franchisees to select sites that comply with site cri-
teria that they have developed in regard to general location,
neighborhood, traffic patterns, parking, size, layout, other
physical characteristics of the site, rental terms, purchase
price, the economic circumstances of the community, and
other basic demographics. Other franchisors exercise exten-
sive control over site selection through formal real estate
programs and obligate themselves in the franchise agree-
ment to find the franchisee a suitable site. This level of fran-
chisor involvement and support substantially reduces the
franchisee's business risk and is consistent with policies
protective of franchisees' interests.
When the franchisor is obligated to find a suitable site,
however, franchisees held liable as operators or owners
under CERCLA may iook to the franchisor for breach of
contract, even if the site was "suitable" in terms of competi-
tion and market demand. Essentially, the claim would be
that the franchisor has failed to do what it had agreed to do
in the franchise contract, because a contaminated site is not
suitable, no matter vvhat business the franchisee is in.
In anticipation of this problem, many franchisors include
exculpatory language in the franchise agreement, which
expressly indicates that they do not guarantee the site. Such
language has been sufficient to relieve a franchisor from lia-
bility for approving an unprofitable site (Btirger King Corp.
V. James R. Atisnn, Loretta W, Austin and A.ustin Food
Corp. 1990). Because of the distinctly different policy con-
siderations, however, it is not clear whether the same lan-
guage would insulate a franchisor from claims arising from
a franchisee's environmental liability. Thus, though "suit-
able" does not imply profitable, it might imply an obligation
to find an uncontaminated site.-
In addition to any contractual duty franchisors may have
assumed, franchisees often claim that franchisors owe them
a tlduciarj' duty. In site selection, if the franchisor has such
a duty, the franchisee might rely on the franchisor's assis-
tance to ensure that a chosen site is suitable and uncontami-
nated. If the franchisor has not taken the steps to ascertain
the suitability of the site before approving it, the franchisee
could claim, a breach of fiduciar>' duty. Although the vast
majority of the state and federal jurisdictions have relied on
'Independent contractor" language in the franchise agree-
ment to rale out any fiduciary duty, a few courts hav.3
ignored such language and found the franchisor liable
(Dotned Stadium Hotel, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc, 1984:
Power Motive Corp, v. Mannesmann Demag Corp. 198D),
Under either contractual or fiduciary duty, to the e,Kteni
that the franchisor obligates itself to play a formal role in the
site selection process, it increases its chances of being held
liable for contribution for CERCLA cleanup. These altema-
tive theories, therefore, offer additional suppon for H ,
->The couns also have honored e.xcuipatory language ir. the franchise
agresmeni when the clairr, "vvas for franchisor negligence for taiimg to
selec: a ,-;iic;e35fui site for its franchisees I Burger King Corp. v, James R.
Austin, a: al 1990), but wheihar a franchisor's duly of care tnciudes iden-
iifvin» an environmentally clean site has not been tested yet.
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Franchisor as "Owner" of the Site
A franchisor also might oe held liable under CERCLA as an
"owner" if it holds "indicia of ownership" in the franchised
unit. Many franchisors have language in their franchise
agreement or other agreements that states that they are tak-
ing a security interest in the site to ensure payment of all
fees and royalties. This security interest alone would consti-
tute indicia of ownership, and thie franchisor would be liable
for cleanup of anv property in which it held such an interest.
CERCLA's definition of ow-ner, however, specifically
excludes any ''person, who, without participating in the
management of a ... facility, ho-ds indicia of ownership pri-
marily to protect his security interest in the .„ facility" (42
U.S.C, § 9601[20][A]). Under tliis exclusion, a remote cred-
itor (e,g,, bank) that does nothing more thjin hold a security
interest in the assets of the franchised unit is exempt from
liability, despite the indicia o:: ownership. Unlike banks,
however, franchisors with indicia of owne..-ship often play a
significant role in the day-to-day management of the fran-
chisee's operation. In fact, franchisees pay royalties so that
the franchisor will (among othier things) create standards,
monitor compli,ance witii those standards, provide consulta-
tion on problems and issues faced by the franchisee, and
assist generally in the management of the franchise.
Whether a secured ffcinchisor is e,'cemp:, therefore, turns
on whether these activities as a franchisor constitute "par-
ticipation in the management" of the outlet (U.S. v. Fleet
Factors Corp. 1990), I:i Fleet Factors, the ccurt found a
secured creditor liable under CERCLA, even though the
secured creditor was not an actual operator. Ey participating
in the financial management of a facility tc the degree of
having the capacity to influence the facility's treatment of
hazardous waste, the creditor lost the use of the exemption.
The court found that ths phrase ''panicipation in the man-
agement" and the term "operator" were net congruent.
It is noi necessar>' for the secured creditor actually to involve
itself in the day-to-day operations of the facili:y in order to be
liable—although such conduct will cenainly lead to the loss of
the protection of the statutory exemption. Nor is it necessary for
the secured creditor to participate in maragsment decisions
relating to hazardous waste. Rather, a secured creditor will be
liable if its involvement with the management of che facility is
sufficiently broad to support the inference that it could affect
hazardous « aste disposal decisions if it so chose -U.S. v. Fleet
Factors Corp. 1990, 15;57-58),
In the case of liability fc)r the purchase of a previously con-
taminated site, the critical question may be whether the
franchisor had the ability to affect the decision to purchase
the propeny or order an environmental assessment. If so, the
indicia of ownership significantly increase the franchisor's
exposure by lowering the control hurdle.^
În September, 1996, Cong."ess enacied ihe Asset Conservation, Lender
Liabiiity, and Deposit Insuran.ce Protection .\ci of 1596 as part of the
Omnibus Consolidated .A.pprcpriaLion3 ,Act for 1997. This new act over-
rules ihe interpretation of pirticipatior. in the F!e:et Factors case and
requires ac:jai, not potential, participation in the managemeai of the facil-
ity to negate the lender exemption (CERCLA § 107f2j]7FiriL as amended),
Thit .data in this study were ga-.Jiered when Fleet Factors was still good law
and thus should reflect the franchisors' .'•eactions to the lower threshold of
concrol appiied to those with iidicia of ownership.
Because indicia of ownership lower the level of control
necessary to impose liability, a franchisor that holds a secu-
rity interest in the site faces the same dilemma suggested
previously, that is, whether to approach or avoid the prob-
lem. One option, that of avoidance, would be to decrease its
involvement in the site selection process. We therefore pose
the following hypothesis:
Hy. Franchisors that have a security interest in the franchisee's
real propeny will be less likely to pl&y a formal rob in the
franchisee's site selection activity.
The Innocent Landowner Defense
To this point we have focused on the franchisor's avcidance
of entanglement in the franchisee's environmental li.ability,
which suggests that the greater the perceived threat, the
more likely the franchisor is to distance itself from those
activities that might extend liability tc the franchisor. As
suggested previously, if such a course is followed, fran-
chisees are deprived of the expertise that the franchisor
might have on a wide range of topics, including site assis-
tance. The other choice is to become involved actively.
Instead of distancing itself from the site selection process,
the franchisor can assume an even more aggressive role,
thereby ensuring that the problem does :iot occur in the first
place. This, then, is the approach option.
Even if a franchisor is not successful in helping its fran-
chisees avoid purchasing any contaminated properties, by
following this approach it still is exonerated (as is the fran-
chisee;, from liability (42 U.S.C. § 9601 [35]), The innocent
landowner defense basically enables th2 owner or operator
to escz.pe liability for cleanup costs if, at the time of acqui-
sition of the propeny, it conducted "all aopropriate inquiry"
into the history of use and ownership cf the propeny and
therefore had no knowledge or reason tc know of the pres-
ence of hazardous substances on the prcpeny. This feature
of the law creates the self-enforcing mechanism whereby
each time a site changes ownership, incentives e,xist to dis-
cover and cure any existing contamination problems.
The innocent landowner defense therefore creates an
alternative mechanism for the franchisor to manage its
exposLre to environmental liability, that is, by apprcaching
the problem head on instead of seeking to avoid it, even
though Lhis may lead to increases in the relative price of the
franchise. This becomes an increasingly attractive option as
the criteria for finding control by the franchisor become less
demanding. According to some franchise attorneys.
The ever-increasing aggressiveness of lawmakers and couns to
inipose cleanup responsibilities on franchisors, and franchisees'
e.Kpectations of franchisor patemalism, require franchisors in
:he f jture to take affirmative action to manage their risks caused
by environmental considerations (Schumacher, Sniff, and Tra-
chtenbei-g 1990, p, 25),
There may be any number of operational reasons for
engaging in site selection assistance. These may overcome
the incentives to avoid entanglement envisioned in the first
two hypotheses. After the decision is made that lack of
involvement in the site selection process is not an option,
the franchisor m.ust pursue the alternative aggressively. By
formally requiring the appropriate environmental assess-
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ment, the franchisor can provide operational support to its
franchisees during the site selection phase without concern
that by doing so it will lay itself open to liability under the
various theories described previously. Consequently, if a
franchisor chooses to offer site selection assistance, it
should be more likely to reduce its perceived exposure to
environmental liability by requiring an environmental
assessment of all prospective franchised sites. We pose the
following hypothesis:
H3; For those franchisors that play a formal roie in the site selec-
tion process, the greater the franchisor's awareness of and
concsm about liability for environmentai cleanup, the more
likely it will be to require an environmental assessment
prior to its franchisees purchasing or leasing a site.
As suggested previously, because the holding of a secu-
rity interest in the property lowers the level of site involve-
ment necessary to find liability, it is expected that fran-
chisors with these indicia of ownership that have chosen to
manage the site selection process will opt to manage aggres-
sively the environmental investigation as well. It should be
noted that there is an additional rationale for this expecta-
tion. If the franchisee is held liable for the cleanup and
defaults on the franchise agreement, the foreclosing fran-
chisor will be left with ownership of contaminated property.
We therefore propose the following hypothesis:
H4." For those franchisors Lhat play a formal role in the site selec-
tion process, if the franchisor holds a security interest in the
property, it will be more likely to require an environmental
assessment prior to its franchisees purchasing or leasing a
site.
The Study
Pretest of Franchise Attorneys
To understand better franchisors' awareness of potential
indirect environmental liability and develop reasonable
measures for testing the propositions relating to franchisor
attitudes and actions, we conducted telephone interviews of
franchise attorneys representing franchisors in the oil
change/quick lube, muffler, and transmission repair indus-
tries. ,Attomeys were chosen because of their intimate role in
protecting the franchisor from any potential liability. We
chose these three industry categories as a sampling frame
because they were thought to be those most likely to have
franchisees that purchased or leased potentially contami-
nated commercial sites, such as former gas stations. Twenty
franchisor attorneys were interviewed, who represented
50% of the 40 active franchisors known to be operating in
these three sectors.
A structured interv-iew protocol was employed, using
open-ended questions. The attorney-informants were
encouraged to provide any details they thought important,
even if not required specifically by the questions. We sought
responses related to potential sources of liability and the
action taken by franchisors in response to that possible
e.xposure. Initial findings confirmed that site selection was
an important franchisor support activity and that environ-
mental assessments were used by some franchisors as an
integral pan of the site selection process. On the basis of
these interviews, the questionnaire for the franchisor study
was constructed.
Franchisor Sample
The sample for the main study was drawn from the directory
of active franchisors compiled for Bond's 1995 Franchise
Gtdde (Bond 1995). The strength of this particular nation-
wide director}', in addition to its relative completeness, is
the fact that it contains significant information on the fran-
chise agreements of many of the listed franchisors
(Lafontaine 1995). These data on the sampling frame itself
are useful in testing for nonrespcnse bias. Surveys were
mailed to the development manager or president of all listed
franchisors in two industry groups: 153 automotive support
franchisors (oil change, transmission repair, etc.) and 320
fast-food franchisors. Following the same reasoning as in
the pretest, these two groups were chosen as having the
highest likelihood of having franchisees that might purchase
convenient but contaminated properties on which to develop
their franchised outlets. Franchisors are notoriously over-
surv'eyed, primarily by proprietary researchers, and two foi-
low-up mailings were necessary to obtain a satisfactory
sample size. Mailings to 55 franchisors were returned as
undeliverable.
In all, 35 automotive support franchisors (25% response
rate) and 65 fast-food franchisors (23% response rate) pro-
vided usable questionnaires. Because of the inherent differ-
ences between the industries, tests for nonresponse bias
were conducted separately. Data on total number of units
were available for the endre sampling frame (adjusted to
remove those identified as undeliverable), and the respon-
dents were compared to nonrespondents in both industries
on that basis. There was no significant difference between
either industry sample and the relevant sampling frame pop-
ulation (at j7 < .05). Data were available on a subset of fran-
chisors in the sampling frame on several other variables that
could indicate potential response bias. Respondents from
that subset were compared to nonrespondents for each
industry' on size of franchise fee, royalty.' rate, age of com-
pany, number of years firanchising, whether they allowed
area development or subfranchising or passive investmenc,
and, most important, whether they assisted in lease negotia-
tions and offered site selection assistance. Although respon-
dents required a larger franchise fee than nonrespondents in
the fast-food industry- and were more likely to allow passive
investors in the automotive support industry (at p < .Oi),
these factors alone did not appear likely to introduce bias
into the study that would distort the findings. There were no
other significant differences. It is especially noteworthy that
there is no nonresponse bias in the sample on either site
selection assistance or lease negotiation assistance, ttie two
m.ost critical comparison variables.
Analysis and Results
From, the pretest, we knew that environmental liability for
the cleanup of previously contaminated sites was associated
with the acquisition of traditional stand-alone units (i.e., not
kioslcs, carts, or stores within other stores). To identify rele-
vant respondents, the data therefore were screened initially
to include only those franchisors with at least some stand-
alone, traditional outlets.
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.Ji central predictor variable was the perceived threat to
the fi-anchisor that arises from the purchase of a previously
contaminated site. This variable was m.etsured on a five-
point Likert scale running from "strongly disagree" to
"strongly agree." The statement read, "In our industry, the
unknowing acquisition of previously contarrinated proper-
ties poses a significant threat of legal liability for site clean-
up" (THREAT). Respondents ranged from one to five on the
level of perceived threa: from environmertaJ liability, with
a mean of 3.58 and a stiindard deviation of 1.23. Sixty per-
cent of the respondents agreed or agreed strongly with the
statemen-:.
In Hj, this perceived threat of liability is hypothesized to
be related to the likelihood that the franchisor will reduce its
formal sice selection assistance. The dependent variable was
operationalized as a categorical (yes./no) response to the
question, "Does your Franchise Agreement obligate the
company to assist the franchisee in identifying suitable sites
for operating a franchise" (ASSIST)?
H2 hypothesizes that iJie retention of a security interest in
the propeny would be dissociated with a higher likelihood
that the franchisor wou.d reduce its formal role in the site
selection process. The franchisor's security interest
(SECURE) was operationalized with the categorical
(yes/no) response to the question, "Are fratichisee obliga-
tions under the Franchi:;e Agreement sectired by the prop-
erty, such that the company has the right to take over a site
upon termination of the franchise for cause-?"
Hi and H? were examined using logistic regression
because of the categorical nature of the dependent variable
ASSIST. The results of ihat regression are reported in Table
2. The THREAT variable was associated negatively and sig-
nificantly with the likelihood of providing formalized site
assistance as predicted (^p < .05) in H|. The security interest
of the franchisor was not a significant predictor, and there is
no support for Hi.
For H3, tile dependen; variable ASSESS was the categor-
ical (yes/no) answer to the questions "Does your company
require franchisees to have a Phase 1 environmental audit
(assessment) performed on all traditional non-mall sites that
they intend to purchase (lease from third parties) in the
U.S.?" All franchisers that required assessments for pur-
chased property also required them for leased property. H3
hypothesizes a positive association between THREAT and
SECURE and the dependent variable ASSESS for those
franchisors that have assumed a formal role in the site selec-
tion process.
The data were screened to identify respondents who indi-
cated a formal role in sits selection, and a logistic regression
Table 2. Logistic Regression .Analysis of H, and Hi
Model Chi-Square 9.129 df 2 Sig .0104
Depe.ndsn: Variable .ASSIST (yes = I, no = 0)
Variable B S.E. Wald df Sig.
THREAT (H,) -.8595 ^3476 eTlll I .0134
SECURE (H;) .6516 .6227 1.0950 i .2954
Constant 5.7769 1.8599 9.6470 1 .0019
Table 3. Logistic Regression Analysis of H3 and H4
Respondents screened on .A.SSIST = yes
Model Chi-Square 12.306 df 2 Sig. 0021
Dependent Variable ASSESS (yes = I, no = 0)
Variable B S.E, Wald df Sig.
THREAT (H-,) .1453 .4780 5 7401 1 .0166
SECLHEi'H./) .9532 1.1663 2 8049 1 .0940
Constant -7.2242 2.3339 9 5806 1 .0020
was run with ASSESS as the dependent variable and
THREAT and SECURE as die predictors. The results
reported in Table 3 indicate a positive and significant rela-
tionship between the perceived threat of liability and the
requirement of an environmental assessment for all sites (p
< .05). The findings support H3. There was only a margin-
ally significant relationship between the holding of a secu-
rity interest and the requirement of the assessment (p < .1),
and thus support for H4 is questionable.
Discussion
Previously undeveloped locations appropriate for stand-
alone retail outlets have become scarce. Because cf their
emphasis on convenience-oriented business concepts, fran-
chise systems are constantly in need of high-traffic locations
to satisfy their expansion plans. Consequently, franchisors
are asked increasingly by prospective franchisees to approve
sites with unknown or vague prior usage. Unfortunately,
many of the best, most convenient sites turn out to have his-
tories :hat suggest the strong likelihood of environmental
contamination (e.g., abandoned gas stations). Both franchise
and environmental regulatory policies are served when the
franchisor requires a Phase I Environmental Assessment of
suspicious prospective sites. .A.s shown previously, however,
there are reasons why this does not always occur.
Although the pnmary focus of both state and federa- reg-
ulatory policy toward franchising has been to encourage
franchisors to disclose accurately all relevant information to
prospective franchisees, ensuring that franchisees receive
adequate support from their franchisors also has been an
important policy goal. If the common rubric regarding
retailing is true ("location, location, location"), one of the
key areas of franchisor assistance is site selection. When this
works correctly, the franchisor combines the franchisee's
local market e.xpertise with the institutional knowledge that
the system has acquired from opening many previous outlets
in order to make optimal site decisions. This reduces the
franchisee's business risk and protects what is often an
investment of the franchisee's life savings. It appears from
the findings reported here, however, that for at least some
franchisors, a reduction in the level of assistance in the site
selection process is related to concerns about being drawn
into potential liability arising from the franchisee's acquisi-
tion of contaminated property. Consequently, not only is
environmental policy not served, but some franchisees also
might get insufficient business support.
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The source of the problem is the unusual nature of the
franchise relationship itself Functionally, it is a highly
dependent relationship. Legally, it is a relationship between
independent entities. When faced with a situation in which
its franchisee could become liable for environmental
cleanup costs, the franchisor has two options. It can focus on
either the functional dependence or the legal independence.
It can use its influence to solve the problem proactively for
the franchisee and itself or avoid entanglement in it.
The franchiso,r's dilemma is not unique to environmental
issues. As was mentioned previously, franchisors face simi-
lar decisions regarding franchisees' ADA compliance and
sexual harassment suits involving franchisees' employees.
In these areas (and others), the potential for franchisor lia-
bility has a chilling effect on legitimate and needed business
support for franchisees. We believe a precipitating factor
leading to this unfortunate outcome is the ambiguity sur-
rounding the franchisor's liability. Congress consistently
has avoided addressing the franchise relationship directly.
This is particularly unfortunate given the importance of
franchising to the U.S. economy. Franchisor liability cannot
be left to the courts, in which inconsistent and state-specific
findings only have added to the confusion.
In the area of environmental liability, as long as fran-
chisors are unclear as to what level of support will subject
them to indirect liability, the initial impetus will be to avoid
entcuiglement by lowering their support. This tendency is
demonstrated in the findings related to Hj, Tne more a fran-
chisor perceives environmental liability as a threat, the more
likely it is to avoid formal suppon for franchisees in the site
selection process. Franchising policy thus is undermined by
this ambiguity, but so too is environmental policy. Ttie alter-
native to disentanglement through avoidance of formal sup-
port is the timely identification of contaminated property
through the franchisor's proactiv^e involvement in the site
selection process. Franchisors will be unlikely to take the
more costly alternative of compelling environmental assess-
ments, however, unless it is clear that all franchisors will
require them as a matter of course. Otherwise, to do so
would place them at a disadvantage in pricing and selling
their franchises.
Congress should either include franchisors unambigu-
ously as responsible parties (along with their franchisees)
for purposes of CERCLA liability for the purchase of previ-
ously contaminated property or exclude unambiguously
activity supportive of franchisees as evidence of that status.
The first alternative would force all franchisors to take a
proactive role in determining whether an environmental
assessment is called for, while obviating any competitive
disadvantage associated with doing so. It would place their
analyses of the environmental suitability of a franchisee's
proposed site on a par with their analyses of its prospective
profitability. The second approach would permit franchisors
to provide important and desirable business services to their
franchisees without fear that those services would be used to
ensnare them in unforseen environmental liability lawsuits.
Whereas the second alternative is consistent with the policy
of encouraging franchisor suppon of franchisees, the first
alternative also has die salutary benefit of identifying cont-
aminated property prior to purchase, when it is more likely
that the original polluter, will bear the cost of cleanup.
Clarification of this kind is vvhat Congress has attempted
to provide the commercial lending industry for much the
same reasons. Like franchisors, lenders are connected inti-
mately with the purchase of property by another party. As in
franchising, the lending relationship is between legally sep-
arate but highly interdependent entities. Although franchis-
ing is not as pervasive as commercial lending, it is nonethe-
less a major factor in the purchase of retail sites in the
United States and deser\'es specific attention. It would be no
more difficult than creating the lender provisions. In fact,
definitional issues, a significant concern in the treatment of
lenders, would not be problematic with respect to franchis-
ing. The Federal Trade Commission has defined what a
franchisor is for purposes of its disclosure requirements
(FTC Rule 1979). and that could be referenced easily in
CERCLA.
The findings in this study indicate that franchisors are
struggling to find solutions to the ambiguity they face, and
Congress can and should take steps to clarify the issue.
Whether Congress should take an inclusionary or exclusion-
arŷ  tack with franchisors, however, is much less clear. That
question raises the type of policy balancing that the coun
faced in Margo Neff, et al. v. American Dairy Queen, Inc.
(1994). Would draw'ing all franchisors into the process
increase the likelihood that environmental assessments
would be done when appropriate? Or would it result simply
in franchisors always requiring costly assessments even
•vvhen not necessary, because the cost could be passed on to
franchisees and ultimately consumers? Conversely, v.ould
allowing franchisors to assist in the business analysis of
sites without fear of entanglement in environmental liability
lead to a reduction in environmental assessments even when
appropriate? If so, we expect an increase in franchisee bank-
ruptcies with taxpayers ultimately bearing the costs of
cleanup as the original polluter becomes increasingly
remote from the propeny.
An opposing viewpoint is wonh noting. Franchise regu-
latory policy has been focused not only on franchisee sup-
pon, but also on the uneven power that is presumed to exist
between franchisor and franchisee. In this context, what is
perceived as support by the franchisor may be perceived as
coercion by franchisees and regulators (see Boedecker and
Morgan 1980), Franchisor requirements of environmental
assessments, then, could be interpreted as forcing unneces-
sary costs on the franchisee. This argument does not seem
appealing, however, when applied to site selection assis-
tance, in which it is difficult to see the motivation for a fran-
chisor to control the process to the franchisee's detriment.
Both franchise policy and environmental policy are
served best if franchisors take an active role in the site selec-
tion process, one that includes the formal requirement of an
environmental assessment in all cases in which it is .appro-
priate. To ensure such a direct approach to the problem, and
in the absence of effective industry self-regulation, direct
governmental involvement may be necessary.
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